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Abstract—Website takedown has been used to disrupt criminal
activities for well over a decade. Yet little is known about its
overall effectiveness, particularly as many websites can be re-
placed rapidly and at little cost. We conducted lengthy interviews
with a range of people actively engaged in website takedown,
including commercial companies that offer specialist services,
organisations targeted by criminals, UK law enforcement and
service providers who respond to takedown requests. We found
that law enforcement agencies are far less effective at takedown
than commercial firms, who get an awful lot more practice.
We conclude that the police must either raise their game, or
subcontract the process.
I. INTRODUCTION
Website takedown is a key tool used by financial institutions
to defend against ‘phishing’ – the use of fraudulent websites
to steal customer credentials [33]. Takedown is also used to
disrupt a range of other crimes, by removing the websites used
in advance fee frauds, disseminating malware, distributing
child sexual abuse content, recruiting money mules, or for
trading stolen credit card details, pharmaceuticals or other
illicit goods [34]. Takedown usually requires intervention by
service providers, which includes both hosting providers and
domain name registrars.
Options for hosting criminal websites include compromising
an existing host to add extra pages, using free providers who
allow the creation of simple websites, using a paid-for hosting
provider (for which the criminal can choose the domain name),
or setting up a website as a hidden service that can only be
accessed using an anonymity network [33].
The takedown of these websites is achieved in many differ-
ent ways, undertaken alone or in combination. These include
the hosting provider taking down the website, having the
owners of a compromised machine remove offending pages,
suspending the domain name, or seizing the physical server as
part of a wider law enforcement initiative. Website takedown
is an example of situational crime prevention, as it aims to
change the environment in which crime occurs [8].
Research into takedowns of websites disseminating malware
has found that responsiveness by hosting providers depends on
the countermeasures adopted by offenders, and the way take-
downs are requested [7]. However, little is known about the
effectiveness of website takedown as an intervention method to
disrupt different types of online crime. In particular, websites
can quickly reappear, and legitimate websites can be adversely
affected [35], [36]. Moore and Clayton [33] examined the
effects of website takedown on phishing, and found that it
is helpful, but it cannot completely mitigate phishing attacks
as it will never be instantaneous.
II. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
We interviewed key players who are actively engaged in
the website takedown process to explore the issues with it in
depth. The questions we tackle in this research are:
1) How do websites differ according to their criminal
purpose?
2) What organisations are involved in website takedown?
3) How are websites taken down?
4) What are the challenges with website takedown?
5) What are the intended effects of website takedown?
6) What are the unintended effects of website takedown?
7) What displacement occurs following website takedown?
This paper gives us an insight into the state of phishing
after 10 years of co-evolution by the attackers and defenders.
Although there are a number of papers discussing specific
aspects of takedown, we believe this is the first to survey all
the professional participants (other than the criminals) in order
to get an overall picture of what works and what doesn’t.
III. METHODOLOGY
This is a qualitative study, using interviews to garner the
views and amalgamate the experience of a sample of people
who are knowledgeable about this area. We are not doing
quantitative research where we would be attempting to make
precise measurements. The majority of papers in the computer
science literature are quantitative, in that they count incidents
and quantify losses. There is also great value in qualitative
research, especially when we need to understand the structure
and nature of a problem in order to work out what to measure
in later studies.
Our research examines the takedown of websites used for
criminal purposes. These included the recruitment of money
mules; fake websites, including those used for phishing; mal-
ware dissemination; the sale of counterfeit and illicit goods;
and child sexual abuse content.
We did not consider takedowns performed for intellectual
property infringement and other civil matters, nor similar
activities such as the removal of copyright infringing material,
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‘filtering’ or ‘blocking’ websites, removing malicious mobile
applications from app stores, and taking down (or taking over)
botnet command and control (C&C) servers or redirecting
malware domains to ‘sinkholes’. Also outside our remit were
incidents where websites are ‘taken down’ by offenders, such
as website defacement and denial of service attacks.
A. Research Design
We interviewed participants actively involved in various
aspects of website takedown. They worked for companies who
provide takedown services for hire, organisations impersonated
by fake websites in phishing attacks, service providers, or
were members of UK law enforcement. In total, 22 interviews
were completed, with 24 individuals from 18 organisations
participating. Recruitment involved emailing relevant contacts,
informing them about the project, and asking if they would be
willing to take part.
A semi-structured interview schedule was used, which
explored the research questions in depth. Participants were
interviewed face-to-face, by telephone, or using VoIP. The
interviews took between 40 and 99 minutes, with a mean time
of 64 minutes.
B. Participants
Most participants had been involved in website takedown
for quite some time, with relevant experience ranging from
6 months to 11 years. Directly relevant experience totalled
121 years, with a conservative estimate of 1.3 million web-
sites having been removed. Participants were from the UK,
elsewhere in Europe, and the USA.
Participants TC1 to TC5 are from takedown companies; par-
ticipants LE1 to LE6 are UK law enforcement; and participants
BO1 to BO6 (brand owners) are from targeted organisations,
including government agencies. The remaining participants
(UC1 to UC5) are uncategorised, as doing so could poten-
tially re-identify them or their organisations. The participant
identifiers are used to differentiate responses from different
interviews. The handful of interviews that had more than one
participant are referred to using the same identifier, therefore
there are 22 participant identifiers, yet 24 participants.
C. Analysis
The interviews were analysed using qualitative content anal-
ysis procedures. A qualitative research design was selected for
its ability to provide a deeper understanding of the topic than
may be achieved through a quantitative design. Qualitative
research captures nuances and provides richness to data that
may not otherwise be quantifiable [4].
Coding of the data for the first four research questions was
mainly ’data-driven coding’ [18], where the concepts were
derived from the data. Questions five to seven were analysed
using ‘concept-driven coding’ [18], with the key theoretical
concepts arising from the criminological literature.
IV. RESULTS
A. How do Websites Differ According to Their Criminal
Purpose?
Websites may be used for a variety of criminal purposes.
However, criminal laws are specific to a jurisdiction, while the
Internet takes little account of borders. Therefore, a website
that is illegal in one location may not be criminal in the
location where it is being hosted, or where the domain name
has been registered.
The criminal purpose affects how offending websites are set
up. Differences are related to the intended visitor (victim or
offender, which includes the consumer of illicit goods), and
how the websites are hosted (compromised website, registered
domain name, or hidden service on an anonymity network).
Phishing websites intend to attract victims – they are set
up in high volume and are active for short periods of time.
Their targets are generally quick to respond to these attacks.
Phishing pages are often hosted on legitimate sites that have
been compromised (TC1, UC1, TC5). TC1 indicated that, for
phishing attacks, about 80% are hosted on compromised sites,
about 10% are on free hosting services, and the remaining 10%
are on paid-for services. TC2 advises that the modus operandi
for phishing sites varies for some targets, with fraudulent
impersonators of Bitcoin wallet providers typically registering
a domain name.
Criminal marketplaces, which have multiple sellers trading
in illicit goods such as drugs or stolen data, generally only
use the one website, so as to differentiate themselves from
their competitors. Buyers and sellers may trade on multiple
marketplaces, and the success of a website partially depends
on its reputation [21]. Continuity is important, and they will
have hosting arrangements little different from legal websites.
Some marketplaces are hosted on hidden services, although
many are not (BO5).
On the other hand, online stores selling illegal goods, such
as unlicensed pharmacies or credit card brokers, may operate
multiple websites, usually with registered domain names.
However, they may use compromised websites to drive traffic
to their store-fronts. For example, illicit pharmacies began
using search redirection attacks after search engines barred
their advertisements [30], [31].
B. What Organisations are Involved in Website Takedown?
The takedown landscape is intricate, with contributions from
private companies, self-regulatory bodies, government agen-
cies, volunteer organisations, law enforcement, and service
providers. Each of these has distinct roles and represents
different interests, while also performing many tasks in com-
mon. Some of the parties involved in website takedown are
controversial, due to their previous methods,1 targets [29],
or other activities [10]. In theory, website takedowns can
be requested by any individual or organisation. However,
with experience comes efficiency, particularly with industry
knowledge and, importantly, contacts (TC1).
1http://wiki.aa419.org/index.php/New Bandwidth Policy
1) Targeted organisations: Brand owners, service providers
and government agencies can be targeted by offenders. By no
means all of the offending websites that are identified will be
taken down by the targeted organisation (BO3). Organisations
may see this as a ‘whack-a-mole’ problem; some will not do
anything about sites that are unlikely to do much damage,
as they will just reappear anyway. Instead, they may direct
their resources towards detecting and stopping attempts to
use compromised credentials (BO3). Targeted organisations
typically only take down websites that impersonate their brand
directly (BO1), even when other websites in the criminal value
chain, such as those used for recruiting money mules, could
be better targets as they cause harm to industry overall.
2) Commercial takedown companies: When targeted or-
ganisations learn of websites impersonating their brand, they
may organise takedown themselves, pass the information on
to a specialist contractor, or a combination of the two (BO1,
BO2, BO3, BO4, BO5, LE3). Commercial takedown com-
panies provide takedown for hire. To take websites down
quickly these companies automate the process (TC5). They
have cultivated professional relationships with registrars and
hosting providers, and some retain staff with the language
skills to facilitate takedowns in countries that may otherwise
be difficult (TC5).
3) Volunteer groups: Some groups instigate takedowns
voluntarily. Artists Against 419 (AA419)2 targets websites that
fall outside the attention of financial institutions, as they do
not imitate legitimate organisations but entirely fake compa-
nies, such as banks, solicitors, mule recruitment or escrow
agents [34]. More unusual has been Anonymous’ #OpISIS
vigilante campaign, aimed at taking down websites, as well
as email and social media accounts, used by Islamic State [2].
4) Industry self-regulation: Such bodies include the UK’s
Internet Watch Foundation (IWF). The IWF receives com-
plaints about child sexual abuse content on the Internet with
the aim of minimising its availability. The IWF requests
takedowns for websites hosted in the UK, informs their coun-
terparts in other countries of material hosted internationally,
shares information with law enforcement, and provides a URL
list for Internet filtering purposes [26].
5) Law enforcement agencies: Law enforcement agencies
also conduct takedowns. In the UK most of this is done by the
National Crime Agency (NCA), which includes the National
Cyber Crime Unit, and by the City of London Police, which
includes the Police Intellectual Property Crime Unit (PIPCU)
and the National Fraud Intelligence Bureau (NFIB). The
NFIB also coordinates takedown for the Financial Conduct
Authority, Trading Standards and other police forces (LE2).
By comparison with private and volunteer organisations, law
enforcement are involved in relatively few takedowns [34].
The majority of takedowns relate to phishing. However it is
difficult to determine the extent of victimisation and financial
loss attributed to any particular offender, making it hard to get
law enforcement involved (BO2, TC2, BO4, BO5).
2http://www.aa419.org AA419’s name refers to the advance fee frauds that
take on the 419 name from the relevant article in Nigeria’s Criminal Code.
TC2 reports phishing sites to the police in the jurisdiction
where the site is hosted, although responses are infrequent.
TC5 occasionally provides intelligence to law enforcement
when they believe it is actionable and useful for investigations.
However, LE1 told us that law enforcement rarely receives re-
ports from targeted organisations for brand protection reasons:
they do not wish to be publicly associated with fraudulent
activities.
In a small number of countries, Italy being one, service
providers require takedown requests to be validated by local
law enforcement before being actioned (TC5). TC5 advised
that the frequency with which they needed to go to law en-
forcement with such requests depended on how often offenders
were using service providers in these jurisdictions, but it was
typically one to two percent of takedowns.
6) Quantifying Takedown: We urge some caution when
reviewing the number of takedowns across different types
of organisations, and recommend this is not done on a
comparative basis. The first concern is that takedown may
be counted differently by different organisations, such as
counting the number of requests sent, rather than the number
of takedowns actioned, counting the takedown of re-appearing
sites as new takedowns, or counting each unique URL as a
separate website, even if ultimately they reach exactly the
same webpage. Also, some organisations have limited remits,
such as only taking down websites hosted in their jurisdiction,
for particular types of crime, or that infringe certain brands,
while others undertake additional disruption and investigation
activities along with takedowns.
We do not report the number of takedowns reported to us by
each participant on an individual basis, as this could identify
the people we spoke to. Instead, we provide aggregate statis-
tics. We asked participants the number of takedowns they had
been involved in, and the number of years they had been doing
takedowns. In some cases estimates were provided, rather than
precise numbers. As some participants had been taking down
websites much longer than others, we attempted to standardise
responses by dividing the total takedowns by the number of
years. However there are limitations in this approach, as there
may have been more takedowns in recent years. Organisation
types that are represented with less than 4 participants are
aggregated as ‘other’. Responses are included in Table I, and
are provided for illustrative, rather than comparative, purposes.
C. How are Websites Taken Down?
Websites are usually taken down in two distinct ways. The
first is the issuing of explicit ‘Takedown Orders’, the second
and far more common approach is the use of a voluntary
‘Notice and Takedown’ regime. Website owners can be alerted
directly to the fact that their website has been compromised,
and asked to fix it (TC1, TC5). However, firms with a poorer
understanding of computer security and technical matters are
more likely to have their websites compromised in the first
place, and less likely to be able to rectify a compromise
promptly (TC1).
TABLE I
AGGREGATED RESPONSES RELATING TO REPORTED TAKEDOWNS BY ORGANISATION TYPE
Organisation type Takedowns
Experience
(years)
Takedowns
per year
Percentage
of takedowns
n Total Mean Total Mean
Law enforcement 6 3 022 504 25.5 4.3 119 0.23
Takedown company 5 1 004 227 200 845 46.5 9.3 21 596 77.65
Targeted organisation 6 264 702 44 117 18.5 3.1 14 308 20.47
Other 5 21 350 4 270 30.5 6.1 700 1.65
Total 22 1 293 301 121 - 100
1) Takedown Orders: Takedown orders are issued by courts
or in some jurisdictions by law enforcement. UC2 and LE3
differentiated between takedowns requested by law enforce-
ment for prevention and disruption purposes, and those that
are part of an investigation. The latter may include the seizure
of servers (LE3), be coordinated with arrests (LE2), and have
judicial oversight.
Court issued warrants or orders must be complied with
within the relevant jurisdiction. Various types of actions may
be required (LE4). For example, a seize and takedown order
will result in subsequent visitors seeing a non-existent domain
response to any queries. However, an order to seize and post
notice will direct visitors to a notice page for a specified period
of time [38].
While there has been very little takedown of hidden services
in the past, this changed with Operation Onymous, a coordi-
nated action targeting weapons and drugs sold on online mar-
ketplaces operating as Tor hidden services. In November 2014,
more than 410 hidden services were taken down and 17 people
were arrested [16].
2) Notice and Takedown: This is by far the most common
approach to website takedown. Organisations or individuals
requesting takedown issue a ‘takedown notice’ to the provider
[33]. The appropriate recipient of a takedown notice depends
on what is being taken down (a domain name or the provision
of hosting), and upon the nature of the website, such as
whether it is hosted on free webspace or on a compromised
machine (TC1). The important distinction from Takedown
Orders is that these are requests, not demands (TC1, UC5).
While some takedown notices issued by law enforcement make
this distinction clear, other policing agencies have been more
forceful and phrase their request as if it were an order (UC2).
Criminal behaviour is generally in contravention of
providers’ terms of service and so they have a sound basis
on which to act when a notice is received (UC5). Some
service providers pro-actively monitor their own systems for
offending websites (UC1). Others have engaged takedown
companies to identify offending websites for them (TC5).
One of the participants, from a hosting provider, advised
they rarely receive takedown requests, as they remove most
offending websites (usually phishing sites) themselves, under
their ‘acceptable usage policy’. When a website is taken
down by this hosting provider the site owner is contacted and
advised.
Where abusive domain names are similar to trade-
marks, the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and
Numbers (ICANN) has a Uniform Domain-Name Dispute-
Resolution Policy (UDRP), which is followed by all their
registrars [23]. Registrars are also signatories to Registrar
Accreditation Agreements (RAAs), which are contracts with
ICANN relating to the registration of domain names in the
gTLDs (global top level domains). RAAs entered into after
28 June 2013 are subject to the 2013 agreement [24] while
the 2009 RAA [22] is applicable for 5 years after signing (so
will remain relevant until 2018).
The 2013 RAA requires registrars to maintain a dedicated
abuse point of contact, with an email address and telephone
number, to receive reports of illegal activity from law en-
forcement, consumer protection, quasi-governmental and other
similar organisations in the jurisdictions in which the registrar
has a physical office. Reports of ‘illegal activity’ (under
‘applicable law’) that are ‘well-founded’ are required to be
reviewed within 24 hours. Actions taken in response to reports
should be ‘necessary and appropriate’. Both the 2009 and 2013
RAAs have requirements for WHOIS data accuracy, which is
opens up another avenue for complaint when domain names
have been registered with false details (TC2).
The applicability of the 2013 RAA for UK law enforcement
requests is limited to registrars that have adopted this version
and maintain a UK office. There is no guidance provided in
relation to what is a ‘well-founded’ report, which may be
problematic when the reports are allegations, with no judicial
findings. However, the RAAs do imply that registrars should
be responsive and LE2 and LE5 advised that if they failed to
have a domain name taken down by a registrar, they escalate
the matter to the relevant registry, and, if required, to ICANN.
The procedure for issuing takedown notices varies by the
requesting organisation. A participant from a hosting provider
told us that takedown companies used their standard reporting
procedures, but that 5% of the takedowns they actioned came
from law enforcement and were accompanied by a court
order. We were told that law enforcement agencies usually
complete their own standard form (LE1), while takedown
companies get faster service by tailoring requests to the service
provider (TC1, TC5): they know that this firm wants them to
open a ticket, that one prefers an encrypted list of URLs, and
yet another firm expects you to phone their call centre and be
able to speak Mandarin.
3) Other disruption activities undertaken alongside website
takedown: Additional takedown activities include taking down
telephone numbers, merchant accounts, online advertisements,
and email accounts associated with the criminal activity (TC1,
LE2, LE4, BO6, TC4). LE5 advised that they had worked with
a registry to blacklist the registration of domains using a partic-
ular credit card and email address. Takedown companies also
input fake details into phishing pages, referred to as baiting,
so that banks can detect attempts to use phished credentials
(TC1), or input large amounts of fake data, referred to as
flooding (TC3). Another activity is to identify what credentials
have been obtained (BO2). If the credentials remain on the
server in an unsecured file next to the phishing page then it is
relatively easy to fetch them (BO4), but when the credentials
have been securely stored this can be problematic because the
jurisdiction may have laws that prohibit unauthorised access
(LE3). When collected credentials have been sent to an email
address, a subpoena can be issued to the email service provider
(TC3). Other ways to reduce visitors to fraudulent websites
include approaching search engines to request they demote
websites in search results, or to ask browser vendors to block
access to the offending websites (LE1, LE2, TC4). For matters
that may fall under civil, as well as criminal, legislation,
solicitors may send ‘cease and desist’ letters (UC3).
D. What are the Challenges with Website Takedown?
1) Challenges for those responding to takedown requests:
The main concern for registrars and hosting providers is
establishing the legitimacy of the requests they receive. Service
providers need to ensure that they are acting appropriately and
meeting their obligations to their customers. There is currently
no standard procedure or oversight for website takedown,
apart from the requirements associated with law enforcement
entering a location and seizing a server. The Internet &
Jurisdiction project aims to create due process for domain
seizures, content takedowns and related issues for requests
addressed by courts and public authorities [25].
At present, this lack of any standard procedure has led to
service providers being the primary check and balance for
takedown requests. Although many service providers hardly
trouble to assess the appropriateness of requests, others may
refuse particular types of takedown request [42]. Notably, in
2013, the registrar and hosting company easyDNS refused
a takedown request received from PIPCU [13]. Specifically,
they questioned how the police could claim the material
being hosted was illegal, or the website was criminal, without
the matter being decided by a court of law. According to
easyDNS’s takedown policy, takedown notices issued by law
enforcement should be accompanied by a court order unless
there is an ‘imminent threat to safety or health’, or there is a
threat to the ‘stability of the Internet’, a concept encompassing
malware, phishing, botnets and spamming [14]. UC1 similarly
requires a court order to take down offending websites, and the
order must be obtained in the jurisdiction where the website
is hosted.
Registrars and hosting providers regularly request court
orders when receiving takedown requests from law enforce-
ment (LE4) and LE2 advises this happens for about 80% of
requests submitted to domain name registrars. LE4 believes
the relationship law enforcement has with the service provider
influences whether or not a court order is requested, and
that they were working to improve those relationships. It
appears that in some cases, instead of obtaining a court order,
law enforcement agencies have threatened to have registrars’
accreditation with ICANN terminated, or to prosecute service
providers who do not comply with their requests (UC2, TC4).
Such confrontational behaviour poisons relationships generally
and is a factor in service providers telling agencies to come
back with a court order.
2) Challenges for law enforcement: LE2 and UC3 spoke
about the difficulties in getting a court orders which, as we
have just noted, are regularly requested. These include the
amount of time involved, which reduces the ability to provide
a quick response, the cost, and having to go to the appropriate
jurisdiction. LE5 advised that if the takedown involves an
overseas service provider, they seek a counterpart in that
jurisdiction to submit the request for them.
The problems law enforcement face when crossing juris-
dictions is a major inhibiting factor for action in relation to
offending websites (UC1). The NCA coordinates website take-
downs for UK police forces with law enforcement agencies in
foreign jurisdictions (LE1, LE4, LE5). The process involves
first requesting preservation of the evidence, then obtaining a
warrant and physical seizure by the local police. There are
good relationships around the world, but the delays associated
with cross-jurisdictional enforcement action, including through
Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties, are problematic (LE1). The
process can take three months, and is reserved for matters
involving substantial damage or high intelligence value (LE4).
UC2 noted that mutual assistance put pressure on the resources
of local police, for whom foreign requests are generally not a
priority.
The shortage of law enforcement personnel with the ex-
pertise, knowledge and skills to request takedown is another
identified difficulty (LE5). Another concern is ‘blue-on-blue’:
where takedowns interrupt other police operations. For exam-
ple, the IWF at one stage was only requesting that child-abuse
websites be taken down some days after they were reported,
to give police a chance to collect evidence [34].
3) Challenges for targeted organisations and takedown
companies: Responsiveness is the main challenge encountered
by those requesting takedown, particularly as there is little
economic incentive for some responders to do anything (TC1,
BO3, TC3, BO4, BO5, TC4). It was suggested that improve-
ments might result from a standardised API for reporting
abuse (BO4). A related challenge is time to takedown (TC5).
TC5 advised that they concentrated on building good rela-
tionships with the service providers, and automated processes
to report websites for takedown, to limit delays and expedite
confirmed abuse reports.
E. What are the Intended Effects of Website Takedown?
Situational crime prevention incorporates multiple crimi-
nological perspectives. According to the routine activity ap-
proach, crime can be reduced by increasing the capability of
guardians, decreasing the suitability of targets, and decreasing
the presence of motivated offenders [9]. Rational choice the-
ory [11] suggests that increasing the cost and effort to commit
a crime, increasing the perceived likelihood of detection, and
reducing the expected benefit, will deter crime.
We explored participants’ reasoning behind the crime pre-
vention aspects of website takedown, which we categorise
according to the theoretical concepts introduced by situational
crime prevention. Also explored is harm minimisation, partic-
ularly relating to brand protection, and cost reduction.
1) Decreasing the suitability of targets: Particularly appli-
cable to websites used for phishing and other scams, website
takedown may reduce victimisation by ensuring that visitors
to a site do not see malicious content (TC5, UC5, [33]).
2) Increasing the capability of guardians: UC1 suggests
that, by taking down websites and providing website owners
with information about how to fix the vulnerability (which
they must do before hosting can resume), they become better
guardians of their own website in the future. Information about
compromises is also used to inform other customers with
similar vulnerabilities (UC1).
3) Decreasing the presence of motivated offenders: UC1
and UC5 claim that, by shutting down offending websites,
they discourage offenders from the same hosting company
in the future. Also, forum and marketplace takedowns done
in tandem with other law enforcement activities may reduce
the presence of motivated offenders by decreasing trust in
reappearing websites (UC2).
Examples where websites have been shut down, and new
websites appearing under police control, can be found in
both the online stolen data and drug marketplaces. Following
an operation which saw the Shadowcrew stolen data market
being targeted by law enforcement, FBI agents infiltrated the
DarkMarket forum, culminating in the agency running the
server and hosting the communication systems [19]. Similarly,
shortly after the Silk Road drug marketplace was closed in
2013, Silk Road 2.0 was established. Again, an undercover
agent, this time from the US Department of Homeland Secu-
rity, was involved in the administration of the new website,
which became popular despite widespread rumours the site
was operated by law enforcement [12]. This culminated in the
arrest of the alleged operator and seizure of the servers as part
of Operation Onymous [28].
For websites hosting child sexual abuse images, takedown
is often justified solely because it reduces the likelihood that
people who have not previously accessed the material will
stumble across it (LE3, UC4). Investigations done alongside
takedown are aimed at identifying perpetrators and ideally
rescuing the victims of abuse (LE3).
4) Reducing the benefits: A reduction in the benefit to
offenders discourages them from that crime type (TC2, TC4).
For fraud, this is related to victims not being able to reach
the website (TC4). However, benefits can also be reduced for
‘victimless’ websites, such as online markets, where offenders
trade in illicit goods and services including drugs, stolen
data, and firearms. Almost one quarter of websites with child
sexual abuse images are commercial, and some referrals also
generate revenue for affiliate marketing schemes (UC4). Here,
the intended effect of takedown is the interruption of illicit
trading (UC4).
5) Increasing the cost: Website takedown can increase the
cost of maintaining and replacing sites used for criminal pur-
poses (TC2, BO4, TC5). This includes the cost of registering
domain names, hiring botnets, hosting websites or purchasing
compromised websites (UC2, BO4).
6) Increasing the effort: Website takedown increases the
effort required to keep a website active. However, this differs
by crime type. There may be an increased effort in devel-
oping trust and reputation in websites designed to be long-
standing, compared with phishing sites, which are generally
transient (UC2).
7) Increasing the perceived likelihood of detection: Website
takedown can be done in tandem with arrests to increase
the perceived risk of being detected and prosecuted (LE3).
LE6 advised that, following a high profile arrest and takedown,
similar sites were voluntarily taken offline.
8) Brand protection: Another intended effect of website
takedown moves away from crime prevention and towards
harm minimisation (BO1, TC5). Phishing scams pose a reputa-
tional problem for banks, who find their legitimate communi-
cations being confused with fraudulent emails, and who wish
to retain public confidence in online banking systems (TC1).
9) Cost reduction: The immediate cost for many victims
is the direct financial loss, as well as the emotional costs
associated with being a victim. Further indirect costs for
targeted organisations, such as financial institutions, include
responding to reports of phishing sites and dealing with
customers who report they may have divulged their personal
information (TC1, BO2, TC5).
F. What are the Unintended Effects of Website Takedown?
While most of the time takedown requests are well meaning,
they can be errors as well as intentional misuse. These are
more likely to occur when service providers do not verify
takedown requests [34]. Some requests have been so bad the
Electronic Frontier Foundation set up the ‘Takedown Hall of
Shame’ [15]. Quantifying unintended outcomes is problematic,
as they may not become known to requesters, and if known
they may not be widely publicised.
1) Consequences for legitimate site owners: TC2 and LE3
advise that false positives are extremely rare. Other partici-
pants report that accidently taking down legitimate websites is
an unintended consequence of takedown, and harms legitimate
website owners (UC1, LE2, TC3, LE4, LE5, TC4, UC5).
Examples are the takedown of the Dajaz1 and Rojadirecta
websites. The Dajaz1 website had been hosting copyrighted
songs, with the permission of the rights holders, while the
Rojadirecta website was a sports website which linked to other
websites containing copyrighted material, but did not host
any infringing material itself. These websites were eventually
returned to the registrants after being taken down by law en-
forcement, but after much time and many legal challenges [27].
Consequences for legitimate site owners can also be felt
after the seizure of servers, if they are also being used for
lawful purposes (LE1). Targeted firms may not even be aware
of all their own legitimate websites, and request takedowns of
websites used for marketing or recruitment (BO2, TC2, TC3,
TC4, TC5).
The takedown of compromised sites is particularly problem-
atic when not just the offending pages are removed, but the
entire site. In this scenario, which TC1 estimates occurs with
20% of hosting providers, the legitimate owner is victimised
twice; first the compromise, then the loss of their site. TC5
advised that they were starting to see ‘domain shadowing’,
whereby the credentials for the domain registration are ob-
tained in a phishing attack, and used to add subdomains. It
then appears that the domain has been set up for malicious
purposes, rather than the account being compromised, and it
can be mistakenly suspended.
UC5, who responds to takedown requests, advised that there
have been rare instances where there had been typos in domain
name requests, or missed hyphens, which had been uncovered
during due-diligence procedures.
In addition to loss of visibility and downtime, website own-
ers have to expend time and effort to get their websites back
online (UC1, UC5). Takedowns are particularly problematic
when websites for critical infrastructure or health systems
are compromised, as takedown could adversely affect their
operation (TC5, [36]).
2) Intentional misuse of website takedowns: Takedown
mechanisms can be intentionally misused, particularly as there
is no real legal or economic cost for submitting invalid
takedown requests. Misuse includes taking down competitors’
sites or making vexatious claims. UC1 and LE2 advise they
occasionally receive such requests. Some strongly aggressive
brand protection may fit into this category, as well as website
takedowns following spilled secrets or whistleblowing.
3) The Streisand Effect: In 2003, Barbra Streisand at-
tempted to sue for violation of privacy after a photograph
of her residence, taken to document coastal erosion, was
made available on the Internet. Not only was her lawsuit
unsuccessful, but her legal action drove many more visitors
to the webpage she objected to. This phenomenon has been
named the ‘Streisand Effect’ [32] and was seen after The
Pirate Bay website went back online following a 2006 raid
and seizure of servers [37]. TC1 advises that the Streisand
Effect is relatively rare, being mainly seen with brand abuse
and ‘freedom of speech’ issues.
4) Increased dissemination of malware: Website takedown
may also lead to increased malware dissemination. UC2 de-
scribes how, in the case of The Pirate Bay copycat sites,
sometimes it is better to have the ‘devil you know’, as
replacement sites had poor hygiene, and visitors were often
infected with malware.
5) Disrupting other disruption and intelligence gathering
activities: Intervention can also disrupt law enforcement mon-
itoring of websites for the sale of stolen data, or the gathering
of other evidence on offenders (UC2, [36]).
6) Conflicting with the principles of a free and open society:
Takedown may be misused for censorship. Organisations may
use it to shush complaints, and government controls over
the registration of domain names can be used to suppress
dissidents [36].
7) Perceptions of legitimacy: Takedowns that are not per-
ceived as a legitimate use of police power may damage public
trust in law enforcement. Perceived legitimacy has been found
to be a stronger predictor of compliance with the law than
the risk of being caught and punished [40]. Laws, policies
and institutions that are seen as overstepping legitimacy can
also lessen overall authority of a state [20]. Authorities need
to be perceived as legitimate to gain the trust, support and
cooperation of the public, as well as compliance with the
law [41].
In relation to state use or abuse of authority, it is important
to ask whether the state should have a given power; whether
there is oversight and supervision in its use, such as judicial
authorisation; how the state responds to abuses; and the level
of transparency about the use and abuse of power [20]. These
questions mostly relate to procedural justice [40].
G. What Displacement Occurs Following Website Takedown?
Displacement occurs when crime prevention activities result
in crime moving to alternative locations, targets, methods,
offenders, or offence types [39].
1) Replacement: Sometimes websites are simply re-
compromised and the offending content put back up. For
these sites, the question is whether steps are taken to fix
the vulnerability that led to the compromise (TC5). UC1,
from a hosting company, informs their clients how to fix the
vulnerability before websites are reinstated, so they rarely see
the same compromise reappearing. But TC2 advised that with
other hosting providers, the site could reappear on multiple
occasions. TC5 advised that 10% to 15% of phishing websites
would reappear in the same location within a week.
2) Displacement to a new location: In many cases, dis-
placement means registering a new domain name, perhaps with
a new registrar, compromising a new website, or changing
hosting providers. Participants said this is extremely common,
with nearly all using the term ‘whack-a-mole’. UC2 described
websites as being ‘disposable’, advising that the process is
usually automated. The time taken for websites to reappear
depends on the type of criminal activity, with new phishing
websites appearing within minutes or hours.
LE5 suggests that a measure of effectiveness is whether
malicious websites move away from UK providers. However,
if website operators move to hosting providers located in
countries that are less likely to comply with requests, it may
hinder other enforcement operations [6]. TC5 advised that
they see offenders move to service providers that are slow
at responding to takedown requests.
Alternative new locations include anonymity networks,
‘bulletproof’ providers that refuse to remove websites, and
domain registrars that are more tolerant to abuse. ‘Silk Road
Reloaded’, another Silk Road copycat site, is hosted on an
‘eepsite’ on I2P [17]. But the use of anonymity networks
depends on the type of criminal activity. The ‘dark net’ is used
more for marketplaces, forums, child sexual abuse images, and
C&C servers, but is not used to host phishing sites (TC1, BO5,
LE3, UC4, TC5). Law enforcement participants confirm that
very little of the criminal activity that comes to their attention
involves hidden services on anonymity networks (LE1, LE4).
TC4 advises there is no more criminal activity on anonymity
networks compared to the Internet, as hidden services have
less visibility and thus less traffic. While some underground
forums are now being hosted on anonymity networks, this was
not done with the speed or to the extent expected (UC2). In
relation to child sexual abuse images, hidden services have
been hosting illicit material for some years, but their numbers
have not increased significantly over time (UC4).
It is noted that many bulletproof providers and rogue
registrars are in countries that are not signatories of the
Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime [5]. There are
also indicators of corruption in the provision of bulletproof
services [21]. While bulletproof providers are used for some
criminal websites (LE3, LE4), they are rarely encountered
for others, such as phishing, and their use is said to be
decreasing (BO4, BO5, UC4, TC5). This may be because of
the expense, and/or because most phishing pages are found
on compromised websites. TC5 advised that such providers
did not permit phishing or malware sites, due to the unwanted
attention that they attracted.
New locations may also occur when displacement, or re-
placement, involves marketplaces moving back from the cyber
realm to physical space. This is the opposite of what has
occurred with the advent of new technologies and communi-
cation platforms. There are potential implications for personal
safety, as it has been hypothesised that online drug market-
places reduce the violence associated with more traditional
drug trades [1].
3) Displacement to new targets: TC1 and TC2 observe that
when they start taking down websites associated with one
target, the offenders eventually change target – to another
brand, a different online scam, or other types of offending.
TC2 advises that phishing targets are diversifying, targeting
webmail, cloud storage and Bitcoin wallet providers, as well
as online drug marketplaces.
4) Displacement to new methods: Phishing also provides
insights into how offenders displace to new methods. Some
examples evolve over time, such as registering nondescript
domain names then moving onto fast flux. Sites hosting
illicit forums and child sexual abuse images have started
encrypting data so that if servers are seized, evidence cannot
be accessed (UC2). It is noted that while displacement to
new methods can be annoying, they are rarely used. The
reported frequency in which they are seen varied from less
than 5% (UC1), up to 25% (TC1). TC5 suggested if takedown
companies were training offenders to use new techniques,
they were doing this very slowly. Organisations requesting
takedowns on a large scale keep using new techniques of their
own to overcome schemes designed to frustrate them (TC1,
TC5).
a) Registering domain names to fictitious or stolen iden-
tities: UC2 provides an example where a group initially used
one false identity to register all their domain names, but after
this was used to track them they changed to using a variety
of stolen or completely fictitious identities. Offenders are
registering domains using the personal information of people
who have purchased counterfeit goods (TC4). LE2 advises
of a case where an innocent third party who had a domain
registered in their name subsequently received threats from
fraud victims. According to TC5, offenders are also phishing
for registrar account credentials, and using these to register
new domain names and subdomains to the victim.
b) Registering nondescript domain names: Nondescript
domain names are those that do not appear similar to a
targeted brand or service. Nondescript domain names remove
the possibility for the registrar to refuse or suspend a domain
name registration under the UDRP (UC3, [34]). High volume,
automated registration of nondescript domain names also
makes takedown harder because of the volume (LE3). And
while, with domain generation algorithms, it may be possible
to identify ahead of time what the malicious domain names
will be, registrars often refuse to suspend domain names that
will only become malicious in the future (LE3).
c) The rock-phish technique: Of the phishing sites anal-
ysed by Moore and Clayton [33], 52.6% were attributed to this
one gang (though some were duplicates). The rock-phish gang
is so named because they originally put all their websites into a
/rock directory. The gang evolved their technique, registering
nondescript domain names, which all resolve to a single IP
address acting as a proxy. This made taking down the website
through the hosting provider difficult, as another proxy would
be set up.
d) Fast flux: The fast flux method is a further evolution
of the rock-phish technique. Rather than having multiple
domains resolve to one IP address, they resolve to multiple
IP addresses, which change rapidly [34]. LE3 sees fast flux a
lot, while TC1, TC2 and BO5 advise the method comes and
goes. TC3 advises it now accounts for 1% or 2% of target
websites. Fast flux reportedly poses less of a problem than it
did previously, as it is often possible to identify and shut down
the true content server behind the proxy layer (TC1).
e) Serving different content to different visitors: A num-
ber of methods allow different content to be served to different
visitors, including cookies and geolocation (TC1, UC1, BO5,
LE3, TC5). TC5 advised that geolocation techniques were
sometimes used to block offending content so that it was not
visible to the relevant police, hosting provider and takedown
companies. Websites serving malware exploits often require
a certain version of a browser, or relevant plugins, in order
to trigger the malicious content (TC5). Gateway techniques
serve content based on the visitor’s HTTP referrer value. This
is reportedly used with child sexual abuse images, where some
visitors will see ‘barely legal’ content, rather than the illegal
images shown to those who visit the site using a different
sequence of links (UC2, UC4).
f) Single use URLs: Other times the criminal content of a
website is only served up the first time it is visited. Subsequent
visits, or visitors, do not see the offending behaviour (TC1,
TC2, TC3, BO5, TC5). TC5 advised that these websites could
be hard to take down, however were rarely seen as they offer
little effectiveness to offenders.
g) BGP hijacking: TC5 advised that they had seen BGP
hijacking taking place with hosting providers. BGP hijacking
refers to blocks of IP address space being taken over without
permission by maliciously placing bogus prefix announce-
ments into the routing tables [3]. Takedown of BGP hijacked
sites requires action to be taken by the providers ‘upstream’
of where the BGP announcement is being made (TC5). TC5
advised that they came across such websites extremely rarely.
5) Displacement to another offender: Dread Pirate Roberts
was a moniker used by the operator of the original Silk Road
marketplace, taken from the movie The Princess Bride. In the
movie, the name is used by a succession of pirate captains.
In Silk Road, life imitated art; after the first operator was
arrested, another Dread Pirate Roberts operated Silk Road
2.0. Replacement and copycat sites are mainly seen with
online trading sites and forums (BO5), and child sexual abuse
images (LE3). We have already noted that in the case of The
Pirate Bay, copycat sites are sometimes more harmful than the
original site.
V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
This is a qualitative research paper, in that we interviewed
24 people to learn from their experience of taking down
websites. The insights which we present clearly indicate areas
in which quantitative research might now take place in order
to put numbers and percentages on the different approaches
to the problem. Before we can do that, however, we need
a reasonable description of how this all works. This is why
qualitative research is so useful; it explores the issue from the
perspective of those who are close to the problem. This helps
us look for fruitful directions for future research.
Our main practical discovery is that law enforcement
agencies are simply not very good at taking websites down
compared with the specialist companies that remove wicked
websites as their core mission. This is not surprising given
that the companies handle several orders of magnitude more
business; takedown is a career for specialists rather than a
part-time activity for a single officer.
The main way the firms excel is that they adapt to the world
as it is, rather than expecting the world to respond to their
standard form. They know which firms need you to report
abuse to a standard email address, which need you to fill a web
form, which want you to open a ticket, and which need you
to speak to a call centre. They employ, or can promptly call
upon, people who can speak to these call centres in Mandarin
or Korean. They also have relationships of trust established
with the abuse teams at the various big hosting providers and
registrars. In short, they understand the global system, and
know how to work it. The default police approach, of getting
an order from a local court or threatening to use their local
law enforcement powers, does not have all that much impact
in a globalised world.
The lesson for the world’s police forces is clear. Leaving
takedown to untrained officers who do it only occasionally is
not a good use of resources. The police should either centralise
this activity in a specialist unit that gets enough business
to learn to do it properly, or contract it out to a capable
commercial firm. In the first case there are issues of training
and monitoring, while in the second some attention must be
paid to contract design. Of course, in an ideal world, a proper
randomised controlled trial of these options would show which
one is actually the best.
While most website takedown is done to interrupt and
prevent criminal activities, there are different disruption mech-
anisms at play, such as stopping visitors from accessing the
website, or discouraging offenders by making it more harder
for them to continue their illicit enterprises. There may be
adverse effects, particularly when legitimate websites that have
been compromised are also taken offline. All of this must be
considered when training officers or hiring contractors.
However takedown is to be done, policymakers must seek
to understand the viewpoint of service providers, who must
respect the rights of their customers. This is easier for some
types of content than others. For phishing pages, malware, or
explicit child sexual abuse images, it is usually straightforward
to verify complaints. Other websites appear to be legitimate,
and need more careful handling, with proper respect for due
process.
It is of concern that, in some instances, service providers are
being threatened with direct action, either legal or regulatory.
This is particularly poor practice since it poisons the well for
all. Just as the Snowden revelations of intelligence agency
abuse have made surveillance harder, so also do abusive
and bullying tactics by a small number of law enforcement
agencies train service providers to avoid taking voluntary
action but to say instead “come back with a warrant”.
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